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LIBERTY THROUGH LIMITS:
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS LIMITED
GOVERNMENT PROVISIONS
Patrick M. Garry*
Under the modern view, individual autonomy has become the primary,
if not exclusive, focus of the Bill of Rights. But the Bill of Rights came
about not because of a desire to preserve individual autonomy or to insu-
late the individual from the democratic community. The impetus for the
Bill of Rights arose from the same set of concerns that motivated the origi-
nal Constitution. These concerns involved creating the appropriate struc-
tures so as to keep the new central government in check. The Bill of Rights
sought to further ensure that the federal government would have limited
power and operate in a limited role. Not only does this limited government
model coincide with the original intent underlying the Bill of Rights, but it
also provides for a more objective and manageable application. Under an
individual autonomy view of the Bill of Rights, courts must define the in-
gredients necessary for such autonomy. However, this endeavor is fraught
with ambiguity, and courts must constantly pit the individual against demo-
cratic society. But under the limited government model, the judicial role is
more objective. Instead of trying to define an ambiguous individual auton-
omy, courts simply need to focus on whether a particular right is needed so
as to maintain limited government. In addition, the limited government
model does not put the Bill of Rights in conflict with democratic society.
Instead, it just uses the Bill of Rights to maintain a check on government,
just as the original Constitution seeks to do.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Supreme Court took a dramatic turn of direction under the
leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren during the 1950s and
1960s. In the Warren era, the Court adopted a very aggressive
brand of individual rights jurisprudence, interpreting the Bill of Rights as
setting out mandates for individual autonomy. But this individual auton-
omy was defined in isolation, focusing only on the individual and not on
the larger social or political landscape occupied by the individual. Thus,
during the Warren era, the Court frequently used individual rights set out
in the Bill of Rights to trump the democratic process. And this type of
aggressive individual rights jurisprudence has continued to this day.
Under the modern view of the Bill of Rights, individual autonomy has
become the primary, if not exclusive, focus. According to this view, the
Bill of Rights was included in the Constitution for the sole purpose of
insulating the individual from various democratic outcomes. It is a view
that was set in motion during the Court's New Deal period, and specifi-
cally articulated in the infamous footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., in which it was suggested that the Court would no
longer strictly scrutinize the structural provisions of the Constitution,
such as federalism and separation of powers, but instead would give
heightened scrutiny to individual rights, such as those contained in the
Bill of Rights.1 Unfortunately, this adopted orientation by the Court
served to distort the meaning of the Bill of Rights. It cast the Bill of
Rights as concerned exclusively with individual autonomy. It also served
to separate the Bill of Rights from the overall structural orientation of
the Constitution as a whole. Both these effects contradicted the original
intent behind the Bill of Rights.
1. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). For a discussion of Carolene Products as well as the
Court's New Deal jurisprudence, see PATRICK M. GARRY, AN ENTRENCHED LEGACY:
How THE NEW DEAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION CONTINUES TO SHAPE THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT 102-08 (2008).
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The Bill of Rights came about not because of a desire to preserve indi-
vidual autonomy, or to give the individual a greater trump card against
the wider democratic community. The impetus for the Bill of Rights arose
from the same set of concerns that motivated the original Constitution.
These concerns involved creating the appropriate structures of govern-
ment to keep the new central government in check. The Bill of Rights
was just one more facet in that endeavor. Its purpose was to further en-
sure that the federal government would indeed have limited power and
operate in a limited role. It simply used the subject areas of the Bill of
Rights to specify areas in which the new central government could not act
or become involved. It was as if the Bill of Rights reinforced the bounda-
ries of power already set out, albeit more generally, in the original
Constitution.
Unquestionably, the framers of the Bill of Rights were very much con-
cerned about individual freedom and the natural rights of the individual.
Indeed, this concern had played a primary role in the signing of the Dec-
laration of Independence. However, the framers of the Bill of Rights
were also leery of giving the judiciary the kind of unbounded power it
would need to define and enforce individual natural rights. Moreover, the
framers did not see the individual as living in a state of conflict with dem-
ocratic society. Individual liberty was not defined in isolation, nor was it
seen as something that should automatically trump the wishes of a demo-
cratic society. The Bill of Rights was not ratified to express or protect this
view of individual autonomy. Instead, it was included in the Constitution
to reinforce and harmonize with the general structural scheme of the
Constitution-that is, the provision and maintenance of a system of lim-
ited government.
In Part II of this Article, the individual autonomy, or natural rights,
view of the Bill of Rights is set forth. This is a view that has largely pre-
vailed during the past half-century. However, the Article points out the
problems and difficulties with such a view of the Bill of Rights. It argues
that an individual autonomy view puts the Bill of Rights in conflict with
the rest of the Constitution, pitting the individual against democratic soci-
ety. It also argues that the judiciary is ill-equipped to enforce a natural
rights model of the Bill of Rights.
Part III of the Article examines the general structural scheme of the
Constitution. This scheme creates the structures necessary for a limited
central government. In particular, those structures include federalism and
separation of powers. The Article discusses not only the limited govern-
ment focus of the Constitution, but also the values and purposes behind
this limited government focus. The Article also argues that the Bill of
Rights contains a similar structural focus. In its purpose of limiting the
new central government, the Bill of Rights is consistent with the original
Constitution. This consistency is illustrated through the concerns and




Not only does the limited government model of the Bill of Rights coin-
cide with the original intent underlying the Bill of Rights, but it also pro-
vides for a more objective and manageable application. Under an
individual rights view of the Bill of Rights, courts must define the ingredi-
ents necessary for a sufficient -individual autonomy. However, this en-
deavor is fraught with ambiguity. Moreover, courts must constantly pit
the individual against democratic society. But under the limited govern-
ment model, the judicial role is more objective. Instead of trying to define
the ambiguous concept individual autonomy, courts simply need to focus
on whether a particular right is needed to maintain limited government.
In addition, the limited government model does not put the Bill of Rights
in conflict with democratic society. Instead, it uses the Bill of Rights to
maintain a check on government and to ensure that government remains
limited, just as the original Constitution seeks to do.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article examines specific applications of the
limited government model of the Bill of Rights. It discusses how the vari-
ous rights set out in the amendments were intended to act as a means of
ensuring limited government. The Article focuses particularly on the First
Amendment, illustrating how a limited government model would operate
in that context. And in doing so, the Article discusses how the Court has
already in many ways adopted a limited government model in its First
Amendment decisions.
II. THE NATURAL RIGHTS VIEW
The argument that the Bill of Rights protects natural rights stems from
the statement in the Declaration of Independence that all persons "are
endowed by their [creator] with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. '" 2 According to
scholars like Professor Harry Jaffa, the rights referenced in the Declara-
tion are not civil or political rights, which result from "human or positive
law," but natural rights that predate civil society.3 Jaffa argues that the
natural law doctrines embodied in the Declaration of Independence are
fully incorporated in the United States Constitution.4
This natural rights argument also rests on the writings of John Locke,
who argued that, preceding government, all persons lived in a state of
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration's ref-
erence to unalienable individual rights is said to reflect the natural rights theories of the
founders. MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 234-43 (1996) (examining how
natural rights thinking pervaded and shaped the new republicanism of Jefferson and
Madison, placing natural rights as being prior to, and the precondition of, republican
government).
3. See Harry V. Jaffa, Equality, Justice and the American Revolution, in MODERN
AGE: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 305, 312 (George A. Panickas ed., 1988).




nature, all possessing the same natural rights. 5 According to Locke, indi-
viduals form a society only by agreeing to relinquish some, but not all, of
their natural rights. 6
A natural rights theory was used to justify the American Revolution
against Britain. According to the colonists, Britain's violation of certain
natural rights justified the American withdrawal from the British Em-
pire.7 Under the notion of natural rights prevailing at the time, individual
natural rights preceded the formation or existence of any government. 8
Moreover, since "natural and customary rights were believed to exist in-
dependently of any writing, it was not necessary to enumerate them tex-
tually or to otherwise enact them into positive law for them to function as
limits on the actions of" newly formed governments. 9 Consequently, con-
sistent with the natural rights theory embodied in the Declaration of In-
dependence, the new U.S. Constitution "did not give the national
government power to infringe upon natural rights." 10
Underlying a natural rights theory is the belief that each individual
"possesses a profound, inherent, and equal dignity simply by virtue of his
nature as a rational creature-a creature possessing, albeit in limited
measure (and in the case of some human beings merely in root or rudi-
mentary form), the Godlike powers of reason and freedom."'" Professor
John McGinnis, for instance, sees the free speech protections in the First
Amendment1 2 as protecting a natural right of the individual.1 3 Professor
Steven Heyman likewise advocates a natural rights view of the Bill of
Rights.14 Professor Randy Barnett also argues that the Bill of Rights
serves to protect individual natural rights.15 These natural rights precede
5. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(1690).
6. Id. at 330-31.
7. See Frederic Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law, Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J.
585, 623-24 (2009).
8. Id. at 623.
9. Id. (noting that "a textual enumeration was not understood to have created the
rights it listed").
10. Id. at 622, 637.
11. Robert P. George, Law and Moral Purpose, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2008, at 23. Natu-
ral rights are those which people have "independent of those they are granted by govern-
ment and by which the justice or propriety of governmental commands are to be judged."
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 54 (2004). And the reason "the framers did not include a complete list of natural
rights in the Constitution" is that "it would be impossible to do so." Id. at 55.
12. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. John McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amend-
ment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 57 (1996).
14. See also Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations
and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (1998) (arguing for a
return to the natural rights tradition of John Locke).




the Constitution, and are not created by positive law. 16
Related to a natural rights theory of the Bill of Rights is a view of the
Bill of Rights as protecting individual autonomy. For instance, the free
speech clause of the First Amendment has long been seen as guarantee-
ing individual autonomy. 17 Moreover, the Court's frequent embrace of
individual autonomy as the basis of its First Amendment jurisprudence
reflects a "widespread appeal of autonomy-based conceptions of individ-
ual rights."' 8
Another related theory is that the Bill of Rights serves to protect fun-
damental rights. As Justice Cardozo stated in Palko v. Connecticut, there
are certain rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple as to be ranked as fundamental."' 9 Judicial recognition of a funda-
mental rights theory in constitutional jurisprudence occurred in Corfield
v. Coryell, in which Justice Washington spoke of certain "fundamental"
rights which belong "to the citizens of all free governments. ' 20 Justice
Harlan has likewise referred to rights, particularly those included in the
Bill of Rights, as stemming from those "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions. '21 On other occasions, the Court has spoken of individual constitu-
tional rights as those being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, '22
or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. '23
Viewing the Bill of Rights as protecting fundamental rights, however,
has been troublesome for the Court. It is obviously difficult to define pre-
cisely the parameters of fundamental rights.24 It is also impossible to list
them all. As Supreme Court Justice James Iredell said to the North Caro-
lina ratification convention, "Let any one make what collection or enu-
meration of rights he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty
16. See id. As Professor Barnett argues, "at least some of the rights in the Bill of
Rights were natural, inherent, or retained rights." Id. at 33. Under one view, "natural rights
are the set of concepts that define the moral space within which persons must be free to
make their own choices and live their own lives if they are to pursue happiness while living
in society." BARNETT, supra note 11, at 80.
17. Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Pro-
tection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 248 (2005) (stating that, under this
view, "all speech deserves the same degree of constitutional protection because all speech
entails the same exercise of autonomous will").
18. Id. at 249.
19. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
20. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 179 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
22. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
23. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
24. For a history of fundamental rights, see generally MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHT: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE (2001). For a discussion of the
controversy surrounding fundamental rights, see Howard J. Vogel, The "Ordered Liberty"
of Substantive Due Process and the Future of Constitutional Law as a Rhetorical Art: Varia-




more rights not contained in it."'2 5 Of course, "fundamental rights are not
exhausted by the list ... set out in the Bill of Rights," and the real debate
is over the meaning of those fundamental rights which are not textually
defined within the Constitution. 26 But even when rights are explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, as they are in the Bill of Rights, defining
those rights in terms of "fundamental" or "natural rights" still causes
problems. Interpreting a right as a natural or fundamental right can per-
mit a court to exercise "boundless power.., to expand and contract con-
stitutional standards to conform to the Court's conception of what at a
particular time constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental principles
of liberty and justice."' 2 7 Moreover, if the Bill of Rights was meant to
protect fundamental or natural rights, it is curious why those protections
were not granted vis-A-vis the states. In other words, the Bill of Rights
gave no protections against infringement by state governments. But if the
Bill of Rights sought to protect fundamental or natural rights, it would
seem as if the founders would certainly want to protect those rights in
their entirety, from both the state and federal government. 28
In Barron v. City of Baltimore, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that
the Constitution acted as a restraint only on the actions of the federal
government, not on the actions of the individual states.29 Consequently, if
the Bill of Rights was not going to be applied to the states, it cannot be
seen as securing individual natural rights, since the states could still abuse
and infringe on such rights. In explaining his decision in Barron, Chief
Justice Marshall explained that the Constitution was specifically designed
as a limitation on the power of the federal government. 30
Even more evidence that the Bill of Rights was never meant to apply to
the states can be found in James Madison's initial effort to nationalize the
25. See 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 167 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901).
26. See Vogel, supra note 24, at 1498.
27. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see also BAR-
NEYr, supra note 11, at 254 (stating that the "uncertainty of specifying unenumerated rights
is the crucial issue that prevents some from taking the Ninth Amendment and Privileges or
Immunities Clause as seriously as the text would seem to require"). Similar criticisms have
attached to the Court's application of substantive due process (and its use of unenumer-
ated fundamental rights), arguing that it "provides neither a sound starting point nor a
directional push to proper legal analysis." Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 123 (2000). Substantive due process jurisprudence has
been called "paradoxical, even oxymoronic." CHARLES BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREE-
DOM 3 (1997). According to yet another critic, "neither historical evidence nor the doctrine
of precedent support empowering courts to engage in the moral analysis required to 'dis-
cover,' and then to impose, natural and inalienable rights and subjecting laws impacting on
such rights to the strictest forms of judicial scrutiny." Thomas B. McAffee, Overcoming
Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights and Popular Sovereignty Seriously
as We Seek to Serve Equal Citizenship and Promote the Public Good, 42 U. RICH. L. REV.
597, 617 (2008).
28. Indeed, James Madison believed that state governments posed the greatest threat
to individual rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
29. 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
30. Id. at 250.
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Bill of Rights. He proposed in the First Congress of 1789 a version, which
the House of Representatives passed, of the original Bill of Rights that
included a clause providing: "No state shall infringe the right of trial by
jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of
speech, or of the press."' 3' Thus, Madison foresaw that the states could
infringe on these rights just as much as the federal government could;
however, his failure to nationalize the Bill of Rights reflects the overrid-
ing concern that they need apply as limits only to the federal
government. 32
One difficulty in viewing the Bill of Rights as protecting fundamental
or natural rights lies in attempting to draw the proper boundaries around
any regulation of those rights. According to Professor Randy Barnett, a
natural rights model does "not preclude all necessary and proper regula-
tion[ ]" of those rights. 33 He argues that the model does not view natural
rights "as necessarily trumping all laws that may affect" or regulate the
exercise of those rights. 34 The natural rights model "would not end all
regulation, but would instead scrutinize a regulation of liberty to ensure
that it is reasonable and necessary, rather than an improper attempt by
government to restrict the exercise" of the particular right.35 Professor
Barnett further argues that a natural rights model would not prevent the
prohibition of wrongful behavior that violates the rights of others. 36 Thus,
while rightful exercises of liberty may only be regulated, wrongful acts
that violate the rights of others may be prohibited outright.37 Nonethe-
less, under this model, judges must make determinations of when certain
regulations of certain rights are appropriate so as to protect the rights of
31. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Un-
derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-1867, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1530 (2007).
32. Id. at 1530-31 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452, 458, 784 (1789)).
33. Barnett, supra note 15, at 77.
34. Id. at 14. For instance, the First Amendment speech clause does not preclude all
time, place, or manner regulations. Id. The natural rights model defines a "private domain
within which persons may do as they please, provided their conduct does not encroach
upon the rightful domain of others." BARNETT, supra note 11, at 58.
35. Barnett, supra note 15, at 14. As Professor Barnett argues, regulation of natural
rights, or liberty, may be acceptable so long as such "regulation is warranted to protect the
liberties of others." Randy E. Barnett, Who's Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 18 (2006). Thus, the judicial inquiry should be "whether the regulation can be
justified as necessary to protect the rights of others." Id. at 19. But this obviously requires
that judges make such a determination. Judges will also have to determine what aspects of
natural rights have been surrendered upon joining society. As Robert Barnwell stated,
people give up only "a part of [their] natural rights" when entering into society. See 4
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 295.
James Madison made a similar point: "Individuals entering into society must give up a
share of liberty to preserve the rest." JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1893).
36. Barnett, supra note 35, at 18-19.
37. Id. Moreover, eighteenth-century notions of natural rights "never totally supple-
mented the seventeenth-century American belief in a community held together by substan-
tive values reflected in moral legislation." McAffee, supra note 27, at 611 (quoting David
F. Forte, Ideology and History, 13 GEo. L. REV. 1501, 1507 (1979)). "An aspect of
America's lack of a libertarian heritage is its consistent dedication to the idea that one




Another problem with a natural rights interpretation of the Bill of
Rights, according to Professor Robert George, is that it is philosophically
difficult to arrive at a sound theory of natural rights without arriving at
some agreement on the existence of God and the role of God in human
affairs. 39 Because natural rights theories are "fundamentally concerned
with human well-being and fulfillment," the definitions of those rights can
be somewhat fleeting and subjective. 40 Moreover, since human beings
live not as isolated individuals, but in various types of social communities,
a natural rights perspective might fail to consider the whole realm of
human fulfillment and well-being. Indeed, individual rights are just one
aspect of the larger realm of human fulfillment and well-being.
Under a natural rights theory, the Bill of Rights did not create any of
the rights it specifies; instead, the document merely restates or declares
"the rights that were the moral claims the people already possessed and
were entitled to keep."'41 But a problem with a natural rights model, just
as with a fundamental, or individual autonomy, model, is that it may give
too much undefined power to the judiciary. Under these models, courts
are free to define the dimensions and boundaries of any one natural right.
And this unrestrained grant of judicial power may be "as likely to lead to
injustice and the denial of basic rights as it is to advance those goals."'42
Thus, the question is whether the framers intended to convey to judges all
this power to determine the nature and boundaries of such rights.
Another problem with an individual autonomy view of the Bill of
Rights is that it reflects and contributes to a therapeutic culture "in which
the central moral question is individual fulfillment. ' 43 Such a culture does
not ask whether individuals or society should conform to some external
governance system, but whether individuals are simply happy or ful-
38. Professor John Finnis outlines the limitations to which the exercise of natural
rights are subject: "(i) to secure due recognition for the rights and freedoms of others; (ii)
to meet the just requirements of morality in a democratic society; (iii) to meet the just
requirements of public order in a democratic society; (iv) to meet the just requirements of
the general welfare in a democratic society." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 213 (1980). Thus, a natural rights model also envisions the existence of duties on
the part of the rights-holder. See id. at 219.
39. See Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 171, 182 (2008)
(arguing that the truths underlying natural rights must come from some source beyond the
individual).
40. Id. at 184.
41. See Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The
Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the Constitution, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2007). Such rights were not based on "existing positive legal enact-
ments such as the Constitution or the Bill of Rights." Id. at 1504 (quoting ALAN DERSHO-
WITZ, AMERICA DECLARES INDEPENDENCE 85 (2003)). Natural rights were those rights
that people possessed "before forming a government." Id. at 1549 (quoting Randy E. Bar-
nett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27 (1988)).
42. Id. at 1589.
43. Daniel F. Piar, A Welfare State of Civil Rights: The Triumph of the Therapeutic in
American Constitutional Law, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 649, 649 (2008). "In [a] thera-
peutic culture, the self is the moral order." Id. at 650. Such a culture views individuals as
more dependent and weak, rather than autonomous and self-reliant. Id. at 652.
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filled. 44 This kind of culture departs from the more traditional cultural
models such as classical republicanism or Lockean liberalism, which tend
to treat the individual as less important than some larger moral or civil
order existing outside of the individual.45
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS PROVISIONS OF
LIMITED GOVERNMENT
A. LIMITED GOVERNMENT IN THE GENERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
The framers focused on governmental structures when designing the
new United States Constitution. These structures, rather than any specific
individual rights provisions, were seen to provide the greatest protections
for liberty by limiting the power of government. 46 Within the constitu-
tional scheme, federalism and separation of powers are the most promi-
nent structural provisions aimed at ensuring limited government.
Although limited government is achieved primarily through the doc-
trine of enumerated powers, which prohibits the federal government
from exercising any powers other than those granted by the Constitution,
it is also served by the doctrine of separation of powers. Under this doc-
trine, the Constitution sets up a federal government consisting of three
distinct branches, each possessing its own powers and functions.47 By de-
sign, each branch has enough power to be able to check any abuses of the
other branches.48 This structural restraint on government power thus
serves as a protection against governmental infringements on individual
44. Id. at 649.
45. Id. at 650.
The boundaries of individual liberty and state power are set with reference to
individual happiness and fulfillment rather than older concepts of duty, civic
virtue, or democratic power-sharing.
As the therapeutic culture expands state power, it also threatens to diminish
individual autonomy by discouraging self-reliance and encouraging depen-
dence on therapeutic authority. . . . Thus, while the therapeutic uses of law
ostensibly expand individual liberty, they may also have the effect of increas-
ing state power at the expense of the self-reliance and personal autonomy
necessary for true democratic freedom.
Id. at 673.
46. The structures also reflected a states' rights tradition "that extolled the ability of
local governments to protect citizens against abuses by central authorities. AKHIL AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 4 (1998).
47. For a general discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers and its role in the
Constitutional scheme, see Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the
Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689
(2006). In connection with the doctrine of separation of powers, the framers also estab-
lished a system of checks and balances in which each branch not only had its own powers,
but was sufficiently independent to be able to keep the other branches in check. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 434 (1987).
48. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (stating that a system of separated
powers is "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one




The primary motivation underlying the constitutional scheme of sepa-
ration of powers was the framers' fear of centralized power.5 0 The fram-
ers also saw that a scheme of checks and balances was necessary to
combat the human urge toward abuse of power; to the framers, the real-
ity of human nature was such as to require such controls on the use of
power.5 1 Consequently, the desirability of and need for a government of
separated powers was never in dispute during the constitutional period.
Nor was there ever any real debate during the Constitutional Convention
that the new constitution should incorporate the doctrine of separation of
powers.5 2
To further achieve a limited government and the protection of individ-
ual liberty, the framers employed the doctrine of federalism. Because fed-
eralism seeks to achieve a balance of power between two different levels
of government-state and national-it serves as a means of curtailing the
power of each. Federalism provided a kind of safety valve against all the
new powers being delegated by the Constitution to the national govern-
ment. This safety valve occurred because the states would still maintain
their independence and could serve as a check on the new federal govern-
ment's use of power.53 By preserving the competing layer of state govern-
49. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (stating that the separation of pow-
ers was meant to "diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty" (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
50. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (arguing that the states "will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete se-
curity against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority"); THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the framers be-
lieved that the states would serve to prevent federal abuse of individual liberties). Even
though federalism and separation of powers are structural provisions within the U.S. Con-
stitution, they were designed primarily to prevent governmental abuse of individual liberty.
See Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed Constitutional
Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 875 (2006).
51. According to John Adams, "By balancing each of these powers against the other
two, the efforts in human nature towards tyranny can long be checked and restrained."
Letter from John Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Nov. 15, 1775), in MEMOIR OF THE LIFE,
CHARACTER, AND WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 67 (William Cranch ed., 1827); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 50, at 290. As Justice Black would later
argue, America's colonial history "provided ample reason for people to be afraid to vest
too much power in the national government." Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 865, 869 (1960); see also Benjamin Madison, Rico, Judicial Activism, and the Roots
of Separation of Powers, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 29, 74 (2004). As James Madison wrote, "If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls in government would be
necessary." Id. at 29 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Bucca-
neer Books 1992)).
52. See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF
1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 50-51 (1993).
53. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). A federalism structure, codified in
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution helps protect the independent integrity and
lawmaking authority of the states. See Akil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L. J. 1425, 1466 (1987). The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Thus, sovereign power is
divided into that given to the federal government by the U.S. Constitution and that re-
served to the states through the Tenth Amendment. Amar, supra, at 1492. According to
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ment, federalism helped keep the national government from acquiring
too much power. This "state/federal division of authority protects lib-
erty-both by restricting the burdens that government can impose from a
distance and by facilitating citizen participation in government that is
closer to home."'54
The doctrines of federalism and separation of powers both try to limit
government by fostering a competition for power between various gov-
ernmental entities.55 They both serve as structural restraints on govern-
ment in general, not as substantive prohibitions on any one particular
government action. 56 The doctrines of federalism and separation of pow-
ers, according to James Madison, empower the people "to conquer gov-
ernment power by dividing it."' 57 As Alexander Hamilton wrote, both
federalism and separation of powers act to check governmental abuse of
power and its infringements on individual liberty. Essentially, federalism
and separation of powers accomplish a two-fold dilution of government
power. As James Madison argued, "the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. '58
Thus, both federalism and separation of powers create a political system
characterized by a two-tiered check on government. 59
Professor Amar, state governments would serve as monitors against abuses committed by
the federal government. Id. at 1504. Professor Amar provides a number of examples in
which states are able to provide remedies against federal abuses of individual rights. Id. at
1509. For a general discussion of federalism and the role it plays in limiting the power of
government, see Garry, supra note 50, at 851.
54. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Feder-
alism establishes a system of dual sovereignty, under which the states can be a localized
control on the centralized federal government. See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 504. The
principle of dual sovereignty also protects against a consolidation of power that could lead
to a tyrannous federal government. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-64 (1991).
55. Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 949 (2005) (arguing that, to the framers, the competition among branches
would result in "a balanced equilibrium, in which no branch can accumulate a potentially
monarchical or tyrannical quantum of power, try as each of them will"); see also Amar,
supra note 53, at 1450.
56. Both federalism and separation of powers are structural provisions, insofar as they
relate to constitutional structures and relationships. The structural provisions for separa-
tion of powers in the Constitution were seen by the framers as necessary to protect individ-
ual liberty by limiting government. Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 268 (2000). Federalism and
separation of powers deal with the constitutional organization of and limitation on govern-
ment power. See Amar, supra note 53, at 1450.
57. Id.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 50, at 291. While federalism
allows the two levels of state and federal government to monitor each other, the separation
of powers doctrine allows each level to check itself. Id. According to Professor Sager,
"[Olur constitutional text and jurisprudence responded in part to concerns of political jus-
tice by architecting and protecting structural features of government-the horizontal sepa-
ration of powers and the vertical distribution of authority within a federal structure."
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAIN CLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
nONAL PRACnCE 154-55 (2004).
59. This two-tiered system is what James Madison called the Constitution's "double




B. THE IMPETUS FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Mirroring the scheme of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights serves as a
limit on government. The first eight amendments are all purely power-
limiting clauses. 60 The Anti-Federalists deemed them necessary to negate
the implication of certain powers from the more open-ended clauses of
the Constitution, "such as the Necessary and Proper Clause. '61 While the
limits of the original Constitution were implicit in the concept of enumer-
ated powers, the Bill of Rights contained explicit limitations on
government. 6 2
In the view of the Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights would set "limits"
and build "barriers" against government abuse or enlargement of its pow-
ers. 63 The purpose of the Bill of Rights would be to limit the exercise of
delegated powers, thus providing a second limitation on the power of
government. The first limitation arose from the fact that, under the Con-
stitution, the federal government was one of enumerated powers, prohib-
ited from exercising any power not explicitly granted to it by the
Constitution. 64 But the Bill of Rights placed limits on even those enumer-
ated powers, forbidding the federal government from using its enumer-
ated powers to encroach on areas protected by the Bill of Rights.
65
Therefore, as Professor Dorf argues, the "Constitution's architecture
reveals a two-fold strategy for limiting government-first, by delegating
only certain powers, and second, by checking valid exercises of those
powers with individual rights."' 66 It can thus be argued that the Bill of
Rights serves primarily and fundamentally as a means of limiting govern-
ment. Under this view, the Bill of Rights does not seek to fulfill or en-
hance certain individual values, but simply provides an additional
constitutional mandate for limited government-for example, providing a
60. Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment
Clause: Regularizing the Supreme Court's Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 361 (2007).
61. Id. (citing RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 178-255 (2006)).
62. Esbeck, supra note 60, at 361-62. Another aspect of the limited government nature
of the Constitution was the fact that the Constitution did not impose any substantial obli-
gations on government-for instance, the Constitution did not mandate that the govern-
ment act in certain manners, nor that it had any discretion to decline to do so. Another way
in which the Constitution limited government powers was to create competing centers of
power within the constitutional structure, such as separation of powers and federalism. For
a general discussion of the structural design of the Constitution and the goals of the fram-
ers, see JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE
FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC (2007).
63. Letters from the "Federal Farmer" (Oct. 9, 1787), in ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 261, 272 (Michael G. Kammen ed., 1986); Essays of Brutus to the Citizens
of New York (Nov. 1, 1787), in ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra, at 301,
313, 315.
64. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
65. See Michael Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1175, 1189 (1996) (arguing that by "juxtaposing affirmative powers with negative limits, the
Constitution's architecture assumes that, even when the government pursues a permissible
goal, the government might sometimes violate individual rights-and thus, the negative
limits prohibit otherwise valid exercises of power").
66. Id. at 1191.
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protection against government incursion into certain specified areas of
human life. For instance, as Professor Dorf argues, "It may be possible to
defend the privacy right in terms that focus more clearly on impermissible
government action rather than on impermissible burdens on individu-
als."'67 Thus, perhaps the strongest rationale for a constitutional right of
privacy is based not on notions of individual rights but on the limits of
government power. A similar argument can be made regarding often spe-
cific areas of individual freedom listed in the Bill of Rights. 68
The motivation for drafting and ratifying the Bill of Rights did not stem
from a singular commitment to natural rights or individual autonomy. As
one historian has noted, "There is even reason to believe that the Bill of
Rights was more the chance product of political expediency on all sides
than a principled commitment to personal liberties. '69 James Madison,
the primary author of the Bill of Rights, vehemently opposed such a bill
during the ratification of the original Constitution.70 But Madison's even-
tual support for the Bill of Rights ended up being purely political, insofar
as he had promised such a bill to the Anti-Federalists in return for their
votes to ratify the Constitution.71
The proponents of the original Constitution objected to the inclusion of
a Bill of Rights, arguing that the Anti-Federalists were fundamentally
mistaken about the nature of that Constitution and ignoring the fact "that
Congress would not be a legislature of 'general' powers," but would be
limited to the powers actually set out in the Constitution. 72 According to
the Federalists, the structural design of the Constitution would effectively
protect individual's rights and liberties by granting only limited powers to
the new federal government. 73 The Anti-Federalist opponents of the
Constitution, although agreeing that the conveyance of limited powers to
the federal government might indeed serve to secure individual liberty,
nonetheless claimed that the Constitution's actual granted powers were
not defined clearly enough to serve as a sufficient boundary against an
67. Id. at 1229.
68. For example, Professor Jed Rubenfeld has suggested that the right of privacy
should protect against "a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism." Jed Rubenfeld, The
Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989).
69. See LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AN1D PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY, at xxi-xxii (1963).
70. See Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 75 TEx. L. REV. 435, 461-63 (1996) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEAN-
ING: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)).
71. See Merrill Jensen, Legacy of Supression: Freedom of Speech and Press Early
American History, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456, 458 (1961) (book review); Finkelman, supra note
70, at 464.
72. McAffee, supra note 41, at 1516.
73. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REV. 239, 313 (1989) (noting the Federalist argument that "insisted that the enu-
meration of federal powers provided a clear boundary between federal power and the peo-
ple's rights and that an enumeration of rights would be used to imply the existence of
congressional powers where rights were not mentioned").
1758 [Vol. 62
Liberty Through Limits
overreaching of that power.74 The real danger of a bill of rights, according
to the Constitution's supporters, was that it could lead to an interpreta-
tion "of the Constitution as creating a national legislative body of 'gen-
eral' powers, subject only to the specific limitations imposed by the bill of
rights," thus fundamentally altering the existing structural design of the
Constitution as creating a government of limited powers. 75
The Anti-Federalists did not trust that the structural provisions in the
original Constitution would sufficiently limit the power of government
and thus protect liberty. 76 They wanted even more assurances for limited
government. 77 Even though the Constitution granted only limited powers
to the federal government, the Anti-Federalists were well aware of histor-
ical instances in which limited power had turned into unlimited power,
and they argued that the new Constitution did not adequately guard
against such an occurrence.78 And even though the Anti-Federalists were
largely responsible for the Bill of Rights, they were primarily concerned
with structural limitations on federal power. This attitude was illustrated
by a report to James Madison on the opinions of North Carolina Anti-
Federalists. In this report, William R. Davie stated, "Instead of a bill of
rights attempting to enumerate the rights of the Indivi[du]al or the State
Governments, [the Anti-Federalists] seem to prefer some general nega-
tive confining Congress to the exercise of the powers particularly granted,
with some express negative restriction in some important cases." '79
The Anti-Federalists prevailed on their insistence for a bill of rights in
part because they persuaded the ratifiers that the proposed constitution
so expanded the power of the new federal government that it presented a
potential threat to liberty.80 In initially opposing a bill of rights, the Fed-
eralists argued that "stating limits on government to secure rights might
generate an inference that the national government was thought to be,
like the states, a government of 'general' legislative powers, subject only
to the limits on powers stated in the bill of rights." 81 The Anti-Federalists
replied that they could not trust that any power not granted to the federal
government was in fact reserved to the states.8 2 For the Anti-Federalists,
74. McAffee, supra note 41, at 1562. In fact, a number of the Constitution's critics
argued "that a reservation of all the powers not granted by the Constitution [could] be an
adequate alternative to a bill of rights." Id. at 1562 n.319. "That such an argument could be
made ... reflects that such an Anti-Federalist position was not rooted in reading federal
powers through the lens of 'inherent' rights assumptions." Id.
75. See id. at 1563.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. David DeWolf, Ten Tortured Words, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 443, 447-48 (2007) (re-
viewing THOMAS NELSON, TEN TORTURED WORDS: How THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED
TO PROTECT RELIGION IN AMERICA AND WHAT'S HAPPENED SINCE (2007)).
79. Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST CONGRESS 24 (Helen E.
Veit et al. eds., 1991) (first alteration in original).
80. McAffee, supra note 41, at 1519-20.
81. Id. at 1527-28.
82. Id. at 1528. During the debate over ratification, for instance, Thomas Jefferson
argued that there was no specific assurance in the proposed Constitution that in all cases
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a bill of rights was necessary, not only to prevent the government from
exerting its power in certain areas concerning individual liberty, but also
to reserve to the states all powers not granted to the federal govern-
ment.83 Thus, the primary concern was to limit governmental power, and
this was to be done both through structural provisions, such as federalism
and separation of powers, and through rights provisions in which the gov-
ernment was specifically prevented from acting in specific areas.
Given the Anti-Federalists' views about limited government and struc-
tural protections against the overreaching of federal government power,
it is entirely consistent that they would have viewed the Bill of Rights as a
further limitation of federal power, rather than a guarantee of individual
autonomy through the exercise of specifically designated natural rights.84
As one scholar observed:
[I]t would be a mistake to characterize the Bill of Rights as a guaran-
tee of the rights of the people in general; instead it was a limited
protection against depredation by the national government. It sup-
plemented the enumerated powers limitation by further requiring
that even if the national government were engaged in an activity au-
thorized by Articles 1, 11 or III of the Constitution, it could only do
so within the boundaries set up by the Bill of Rights. What is typi-
cally forgotten (or deliberately obscured) in the popular telling of
the story of the Bill of Rights is that the states retained the power to
do precisely those things (establishing a state religion, punishing un-
popular speech, denying the right to trial by jury, etc.) that were for-
bidden to the national government. 85
Thus, the purpose of the Bill of Rights was aimed not at individual fulfill-
ment or autonomy, but at further ensuring limited government. Under
this view, the rights set out in the Bill of Rights were those seen to be
particularly necessary to limit the power of government and to preserve
the people's right to keep government in a limited position-a means by
which to further limit and control the power of government. This point
was made by Hardin Burnley in a letter to James Madison, in which
Burnley stated, "[B]y protecting the rights of the people and of the states,
an improper extension of power will be prevented [and] safety made
where specific powers had not been delegated to the federal government, those powers had
been retained by the states. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: 1776 TO 1791, at 129 (1955).
83. See McAffee, supra note 41, at 1529. As Professor McAffee argues, "Modern com-
mentators' dichotomy between power-allocative and rights-protective provisions is foreign
to the thinking of the founders." Id. What has been lost in the contemporary debate on the
Bill of Rights "is the crucial Madisonian insight that localism and liberty can sometimes
work together rather than at cross-purposes." AMAR, supra note 46, at 7.
84. To the Anti-Federalists, "because of the attenuated chain of representation, Con-
gress would be far less trustworthy than state legislatures." AMAR, supra note 46, at 11.
Their highest concern for the Bill of Rights was "the idea of limited federal power." See id.
at 14.
85. DeWolf, supra note 78, at 448.
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equally certain. ' 86 And as Professor Barnett argues, James Madison like-
wise equated the protection of individual rights with limiting the powers
of the central government.
8 7
The supporters of the Constitution believed that the protection of indi-
vidual rights depended on "a free and limited government structured to
prevent any interests from becoming an overbearing majority."'8 8 The
Anti-Federalists believed this as well. However, they thought that without
the Bill of Rights the Constitution did not sufficiently limit government.
Consequently, the Bill of Rights was a collection of "provisions clearly
designed to provide a direct limit to government power, at least to the
extent that such a limit was needed." 89 Indeed, James Madison came to
regard such rights as constituting "a source of meaningful legal limits to
government power." 90 For Madison, the Bill of Rights was to be "a means
to bring more effective checks on [central] government power." 91
C. THE CONSISTENCY WITH THE OVERALL CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
As provisions aimed at limiting government power, the Bill of Rights
was consistent with the overall constitutional scheme. According to Akhil
Amar, the Bill of Rights is each "part of a single coherent Constitution"
and reflective of a "deep design," aimed at limiting government power.
92
Under this view, the Constitution and all its provisions are to be under-
stood as "one piece."'93 When seen as a whole, the Constitution is prima-
rily one of "powers, structures and procedures, not of values."
94
Envisioning the Constitution as a coherent whole rather than a collection
of assorted clauses, Professor Amar similarly sees the Bill of Rights as
"largely republican and collective, sounding mainly in political rights."
95
In his interpretation of the Bill of Rights, Professor Amar stresses the
86. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 2 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1188, 1188 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) (arguing
that protecting the rights set out in the Bill of Rights is a means of further limiting govern-
mental power by preventing it from improper extension).
87. BARNETT, supra note 11, at 55.
88. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 21 (1999).
89. McAffee, supra note 41, at 1522-23.
90. Id. at 1523 (internal quotations omitted). Madison, for instance, recognized that
the Necessary and Proper Clause could be susceptible to abuse and that a bill of rights may
be needed "to constrain the means chosen by the general government." Randy E. Barnett,
Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1988).
91. McAffee, supra note 41, at 1555.
92. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 814, 822 (1999).
93. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 492
(2007).
94. Robert Delahunty, Federalism and Polarization, 1 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 63, 68 (2007). In The Federalist No. 38, James Madison noted that some Anti-Feder-
alists claimed that the Bill of Rights "ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of
individuals, but of the rights reserved to the states in their political capacity." Likewise, in
The Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton argued that "one object of the Bill of Rights is
to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administra-
tion of the government." AMAR, supra note 46, at 270.
95. AMAR, supra note 46, at 133.
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collective nature of the bill and downplays the role of individual rights. 96
Therefore, the rights set out in the Bill of Rights should be seen as a way
of limiting government power, not as expressing independent rights or
values in themselves. 97
According to Professor Amar, the Bill of Rights was "more structural
than not."' 98 Even though natural rights were very important to the fram-
ers, they almost uniformly "agreed that the critical issue on which their
protection [of those rights turned] was the character of the new national
government." 99 By including a Bill of Rights, supporters like James
Madison did not want to include rights that would deprive the govern-
ment of a needed strength or stability, but instead wished to create struc-
tural provisions ensuring limited government that would in turn lead to
the enjoyment of rights.100 To the framers, the only real way to prevent
government from violating the liberty of its citizens is for citizens to pos-
sess the capacity to limit government. 10 1 "[I]nstitutional checks upon the
exercise of [government] power were the constitutional instruments
chiefly relied upon by the framers for 'the preservation of liberty." 10 2
If consistent with the constitutional scheme and its emphasis on struc-
ture, the Bill of Rights should not be seen as concerning individual auton-
omy; rather, it is about using the language of rights to limit the power of
government.'0 3 According to Professor Clor:
96. Treanor, supra note 93, at 531 (arguing that the Bill of Rights reflected republican
concerns and collective rights of the people).
97. In connection with individual rights, it is better to speak of powers being delegated
to the government-the rights retained by the people "provide the measure of how these
powers should be exercised." BARNETT, supra note 11, at 75.
98. AMAR, supra note 46, at xiii. According to Professor Amar, the Bill of Rights was
"a document attentive to structure, focused on the agency problem of government, and
rooted in the sovereignty of we the people of the United States." Id. at 127.
99. Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 430, 432 (2000) (reviewing
THOMAS B. McAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING (2000)). According to Professor
Ketcham, the framers' goal for the Constitution was as much to secure "'political freedom'
as it was to secure 'personal liberty."' McAffee, supra note 41, at 1570 (quoting RALPH
KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY 166-67 (1993)).
100. Id. at 1570-71 (citing Harry M. Clor, Reflections on the Bill of Rights, in OUR PE-
CULIAR SECURITY: THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT 153, 158
(Eugene W. Hickoket al. eds., 1993)). As defenders of the Constitution argued, "It is in
such structural elements of a well-modeled government and not in the parchment's careful
listing of powers that the people must find safety," for it is the structure that can "preserve
that necessary energy while discouraging its unnecessary use or abuse." Id. (quoting
DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 49 (1984)). Thus,
"[c]areful students of the debate over ratification have noted 'the constant linkage of the
"personal liberty" issue with the larger question of the nature and structure of govern-
ment."' Id. (quoting KETCHAM, supra note 99, at 105).
101. McAffee, supra note 41, at 1572.
102. Id. (quoting Terrence Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment
on Soger's Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 461, 465 (1993)). A primary concern of many of
the framers involved how "to reconcile the power of government with the liberty of citi-
zens." Id. (quoting JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY 4 (2000)).
103. As Professor Stephen Macedo has theorized, the Constitution established islands
of governmental powers "surrounded by a sea of individual rights," not islands of rights
"surrounded by a sea of governmental powers." STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V.
THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1987).
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[T]he Bill of Rights is no list of natural rights. (There could hardly be
any natural right to due process of law or to petition the government
for redress of grievances.) It is a summary of civil liberties that
(taken into conjunction with the original Constitution) define a rela-
tionship between government and citizen that is in accord with the
philosophy of natural rights.10 4
Professor Gary Lawson likewise argues that the meaning of the Bill of
Rights lies primarily in the structure and history of the original Constitu-
tion, rather than in the specific wording of each of the amendments.10 5 To
Professor Lawson, the Bill of Rights largely "reformulates the restrictions
on federal power" that were "built into the Sweeping Clause. ' 10 6 The
true meaning of the first nine amendments of the Bill of Rights was to
"principally restate" limitations on federal power. 10 7 Given the original
design of the Constitution and the nature of the limited government that
it created, according to Professor Lawson, the entire Bill of Rights was
"primarily an exercise in clarification. '10 8 This clarification related to the
limits on governmental power outlined in the Constitution.'0 9
D. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS TRANSCENDING THE INDIVIDUAL
Two of the jurists most responsible for the development of modern
First Amendment law, Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee and Su-
preme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued that the First
Amendment protected "free speech not as a matter of natural individual
right," but because such a freedom was vital to the conduct and operation
of democratic government. 110 In other words, under the Chafee-Holmes
model, the right of free speech was not included in the First Amendment
to ensure individual autonomy; rather, it existed to limit governmental
104. Clor, supra note 98, at 172.
105. Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 471 (2008) (arguing that "the Bill of Rights was
effectively redundant" because the power to pass laws abridging rights contained in the
Bill of Rights had not been delegated to the federal government).
106. Id. at 472.
107. Id. Although, according to the Federalists, the original Constitution, "by virtue of
the structure of enumerated powers, already prohibited virtually any law that would run
afoul of what ultimately became the Bill of Rights." Id. at 478.
108. Id. at 488.
109. As Professor Gary Lawson explains this clarification:
Just as the First Amendment restates limitations on the federal government's
power of speech and religion contained in the original Constitution, the
Fourth Amendment restates limitations on the federal government's law en-
forcement powers contained in the original Constitution, and the Sixth
Amendment restates limitations on federal power with respect to criminal
juries contained in the original Constitution, the Tenth Amendment restates
limitations on the federal government's power to regulate states contained in
the original Constitution. These limitations ... are conceptions of state sover-
eignty that are textually embodied in the sweeping clause and then textually
restated in the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 493.
110. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);




encroachment on the free and open social discussion of public issues.11'
To Professor Chafee, the right of free speech was justified not as a protec-
tion of a natural right in and of itself, but as a means to secure a particular
constitutional aim-that of limiting government power in certain areas of
individual and social life. 12
Professor Chafee viewed individual rights as only secondarily aimed at
the individual. 113 For Professor Chafee, "an individual interest was served
by the constitutional protection of free speech, but only in a derivative,
instrumental sense." 14 Professor Akhil Amar likewise sees the Bill of
Rights as "primarily reflect[ing] republican rights of 'the people' rather
than individual rights." 5 Although the Bill of Rights does protect cer-
tain individual rights, that function is "not the sole, or even the dominant,
motif. 11 6 Instead, according to Professor Amar, the framers were con-
cerned primarily with limiting governmental power.1 17 With respect to
the Ninth Amendment,tl 8 for instance, Professor Amar argues that the
rights referenced in that amendment mean the rights of the people collec-
tively, rather than individual rights.119 And collective rights can stand for
the right of a democratic people to constitutionally limit the power of
government. Individual rights, on the other hand, would be the right of
each individual to, for instance, engage in the kind of free speech activi-
ties that would serve her notion of individual autonomy.
The structural role of the Bill of Rights is illustrated by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.12 0 Under this Clause, according to
111. See Chafee, supra note 108, at 956-57. To Chafee, the right of free speech reflected
the reality that government was to be the servant and not the master of the people. Id. at
947.
112. See id. at 956-60. Likewise, in connection with the Fifth Amendment, James
Madison viewed property rights as imposing a limit on government power. James W. Ely,
Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 673, 705 (2008).
113. See Chafee, supra note 108, at 957. Similarly, Roscoe Pound saw social interests,
rather than individual interests, as underlying all of law. For Pound, laws that appeared to
protect simply individual rights or interests in reality had been enacted or created to pro-
tect social interests. See Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 345,
349 (1915).
114. Charles Barzun, Politics or Principle? Zechariah Chafee and the Social Interest In
Free Speech, 2007 BYU L. REV. 259, 314.
115. Treanor, supra note 94, at 487.
116. AMAR, supra note 46, at xii.
117. Id. at 159 (arguing that during the constitutional period, liberty "was still centrally
understood as public liberty of democratic self-government-majoritarian liberty rather
than liberty against popular majorities").
118. The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
119. AMAR, supra note 46, at 120.
120. The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of
war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
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Professor Amar, "the jury summed up-indeed embodied-the ideals of
populism, federalism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the origi-
nal Bill of Rights. ' 121 Thus, to Professor Amar, the jury right was not so
much an individual right as it was a structural provision aimed at limiting
government. 122 Professor Robert Palmer has similarly argued that the
jury trial was intended more for "maintaining local communal standards
than for protecting individual liberties. ' 12 3 The jury served as an impor-
tant check on the power of the central government, and jury trials be-
came an avenue by which to challenge abusive action by that
government. Similarly, the Second Amendment1 24 was concerned not so
much about individual rights as about "populism and federalism"-con-
cerns which relate to structural protections of limited government (such
as preventing federal government from prohibiting state militias). 125
Not only can the argument be made that the Bill of Rights was aimed
at ensuring limited government, but it can also be argued that courts can
better define limits on government than they can the parameters of indi-
vidual natural rights. The framers would probably not have intended the
Bill of Rights to give such open-ended, undefined powers to courts; yet
that would be the case if the Bill of Rights was viewed as singularly con-
cerned with protecting individual natural rights, because the courts would
have to decide in each case where the boundary lines of individual natu-
ral rights occurred. But courts are in a much better position to decide
whether a particular individual right is necessary as a limitation on gov-
ernment power. This interpretation would mean that the framers drafted
a more defined and usable Bill of Rights-one that the courts could apply
with much more direction and ease.
E. THE NINTH AMENDMENT MODEL
The "'limited government' theme is often overlooked" in the analysis
of individual rights. 126 "Although the first eight amendments did, in fact,
protect personal rights, the intent and effect of those protections was to
leave control over such matters in the collective hands of the people in
erty, without due process of law; nor shall property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121. AMAR, supra note 46, at 97.
122. The jury trial was fundamentally more "a question of government structure" than
one of "individual right." Id. at 104.
123. See Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in LIBERTY AND
COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, 101
(1987).
124. The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be in-
fringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
125. See AMAR, supra note 46, at 46.
126. See Mark Rahdert, In Search of a Conservative Vision of Constitutional Privacy:
Two Case Studies From the Rehnquist Court, 51 VILL. L. REV. 859, 882 (2006).
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the states" and not in the hands of the federal government. 127 Indeed, this
limited government theme is particularly evident in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, both of which aim directly to limit "centralized govern-
ment authority.' 1 28 According to Professor Kurt Lash, "the Ninth
Amendment was conceived and received as a federalist provision pre-
serving the people's retained right to local self-government.' 29 This fed-
eralist model of the Ninth Amendment looks at retained rights in a much
broader way than simply through an individual natural rights lens; in-
stead, the model applies the Ninth Amendment "any time federal power
is unjustifiably extended, regardless of whether that extension affects in-
dividual" rights or collective rights, "such as the ... right to local self-
government."'
130
James Madison likewise saw the Ninth Amendment as serving to limit
overly "broad interpretations of federal power," and as acting to preserve
state autonomy.' 3 ' According to Professor Kurt Lash's review of the
early case law and scholarly literature, the Ninth Amendment was con-
sistently seen as a "federalist provision protecting the ... autonomy of
the states"-it was not interpreted as an individual rights provision. 132
"For more than one-hundred years after its enactment," according to Pro-
fessor Lash, the Ninth Amendment, as well as the Tenth, was used "to
limit . . . federal power in order to preserve [the] right to local self-
government."133
127. Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 801, 832 (2008).
128. Rahdert, supra note 126, at 882.
129. Lash, supra note 127, at 805. As Professor Lash argues:
The Ninth Amendment was understood to preserve all retained rights,
whether individual, majoritarian, or collective, from undue federal interfer-
ence, reserving control of the same to state majorities. This understanding
makes the Ninth Amendment an active federalist provision that calls upon
courts to limit the interpretation of enumerated federal power in order to
preserve the people's retained right to local self-government.
Id. at 806.
130. Id. at 809.
131. See id. at 844. In summing up his argument that the Ninth Amendment served to
protect the autonomy of the states, James Madison argued that overly broad readings of
federal power should not be allowed to infringe on state autonomy. See id. at 846-47 (quot-
ing 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (1834) (statement of Rep. Madison)).
132. Lash, supra note 127, at 854. Consistent with its federalist character, the Ninth
Amendment "establish[ed] a rule of strict construction of federal power." Id. at 871. The
protection of individual rights was not the single, or even primary, goal of the Ninth
Amendment. Id. at 853. According to Professor Amar, the Ninth Amendment "explicitly
sought to protect liberty by preventing Congress from going beyond its enumerated pow-
ers." AMAR, supra note 46, at 123.
133. Kurt Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV.
895, 897 (2008). As "neither a grant of power nor a source of rights," the Ninth Amend-
ment simply forbids "interpreting particular provisions in a particular way"-it thus con-
trols "the interpretation of other provisions" of the Constitution. Id. at 903. Similar to the
rest of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment's "rule of [strict] construction served to
limit the power of the federal government. Id. at 904. Even though the retained rights of
the Ninth Amendment may refer to either individual or collective rights, the Amendment
nonetheless protects "the people's collective right to control the retained matter on a state
level." Id. at 912. Thus, both the "Ninth and Tenth Amendments work in tandem to keep
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One of the preeminent experts on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
Professor Lash concludes that the Ninth Amendment works "alongside
the Tenth to preserve the retained state right of self-preservation.
134
Under Professor Lash's interpretation, the Ninth Amendment forbids
any constitutional interpretations that interfere with that right to local
self-government. 135 While "[t]he Tenth [Amendment] limits the federal
government to only enumerated powers,... [t]he Ninth limits the inter-
pretation of enumerated powers. 1 136 In a speech to the House of Repre-
sentatives, James Madison argued that the Ninth Amendment
represented a rule of strict construction of federal power, one which pro-
tected the people's right to regulate local matters free from federal inter-
ference. 137 As Madison stated, the Tenth Amendment restricted the
federal government to the powers enumerated in the Constitution, and
the Ninth Amendment guards "against a latitude of interpretation" when
it comes to interpreting the scope of those powers.'
38
[these retained] matters under local control." Id. at 913. As a way of limiting the federal
government, the retained rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment are "those rights
withheld from the federal government," yet still "under control of the people on a state-by-
state basis." Id. at 914 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment is a "guardian of the sovereign
rights" of the people on a state-by-state basis, with the right of local self-government being
one of those retained rights). Under the Ninth Amendment, even after forming a national
government through adoption of the Constitution, the people of the individual states re-
tained their right to control all matters not delegated to the federal government. See
Amendments Proposed by the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788), in CREAT-
ING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 21-22 (stating that "the powers of government
may be reassumed by the people, whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness;
that every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said constitution clearly dele-
gated to the congress of the United States, or the departments of the government thereof,
remains to the people of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to
whom they may have granted the same"). Thus, the people of any individual state still have
the authority to delegate any and all retained powers or rights to their own state govern-
ments if they chose to do so. This essentially left all retained rights to the local control of
state majorities. See Lash, supra note 133, at 915. As Professor Amar describes the distinc-
tion, the Tenth Amendment "says that Congress must point to some explicit or implicit
enumerated power before it can act; and the Ninth addresses the closely related but dis-
tinct question of whether such express or implied enumerated power in fact exists." AMAR,
supra note 46, at 124.
134. Lash, supra note 133, at 918-19 (noting the voluminous historical references to
"the Ninth Amendment as a provision reserving all retained rights, individual and
majoritarian, to the control of local majorities").
135. Id. at 919.
136. Id. at 920. Both the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments preserve the autonomy of
the states by requiring that all retained powers and rights are left under the control of the
people of the states who may then delegate those powers and rights to their own state
governments. Thus, the Ninth Amendment limits the undue extension of enumerated fed-
eral powers and rights against state majorities. Id. at 928. For instance, in the debate over
the bank charter in 1791, James Madison argued that the power to charter a bank reflected
an attempt to construe the enumerated powers of the federal government in such a way as
to alter the essential nature of limited government, and that this violated the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. Id. at 929-30 (citing James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the
National Bank (February 2, 1791), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1999); Memorandum from Roger Sherman to James Madison (February 4, 1791), in 13
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds..
1981)).
137. See Lash, supra note 133, at 929-30 (citing Madison, supra note 136, at 489).
138. Id. (quoting Madison, supra note 136, at 489).
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Another preeminent scholar of the Ninth Amendment has argued that
the Amendment was adopted to combat the risk that the existence of the
Bill of Rights might lead to the inference that Congress had the power to
do whatever was not prohibited by the Bill of Rights. 139 According to
Professor McAffee, the Ninth Amendment served "to ensure that a bill
of rights would not support the inference that Congress held general or
plenary powers to do whatever was not forbidden by the Bill of
Rights."'140 Thus, the Ninth Amendment acted as a limitation on govern-
ment power, not as a clause making natural rights legally enforceable. 14'
Indeed, for many in the founding generation, "the most important 'right'
held by the people was the right to 'alter or abolish' their form of govern-
ment," a right that "enabled them to amend the Constitution.' 42 But, of
course, this right to alter or abolish the form of government is essentially
a right to maintain limited government. As Professor McAffee argues,
"The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was therefore not to secure
'unenumerated' natural and inalienable rights, but to assure that the in-
sertion of a federal bill of rights would not undermine the security al-
ready provided by the enumerated powers scheme."' 143 According to
Professor McAfee, the Bill of Rights should not be seen "as a manifesto
of high moral principle" or as an open-ended invitation for judges to se-
lect their own preferred social values for constitutional protection, but
rather as a "limited set of eighteenth-century precepts" about limited
government.144
F. APPLYING THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS GOVERNMENT-LIMITING
PROVISIONS
The Bill of Rights came into being because of a mistrust that the gen-
eral structural provisions of the Constitution would sufficiently limit gov-
ernmental power. Consequently, the Bill of Rights specified particular
139. Thomas B. McAffee, The "Foundations" of Anti-Foundationalism-Or, Taking the
Ninth Amendment Lightly: A Comment on Daniel A. Farber's Book on the Ninth Amend-
ment, 9 NEV. L.J. 226, 229 (2008) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEO-
PLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICAN
DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007)).
140. Id.
141. See generally THOMAS B. McAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITU-
TION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING (2000); Thomas B.
McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The Four-
teenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
747, 792-93 (2001).
142. McAffee, supra note 139, at 232 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 235. On the other hand, a number of scholars believe that courts should use
the Bill of Rights to protect and enhance a broader vision of natural rights. However, this
view of the Bill of Rights often overestimates the actual capacities and inclinations of
judges. For an argument asserting that courts should act to make sure that natural rights
are enforced by judges, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED (1997). For criticism of such an approach, see STEVEN D.
SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998); Michael W. McConnell,
The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral
Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997).
144. McAffee, supra note 139, at 240.
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areas in which government could not exert power. To interpret particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights is to determine what rights are necessary
to limit the power of government in a way so as to preserve an area of
private social life that can be free to direct and control government. Thus,
the focus is not on what the individual needs to feel and exercise a certain
sense of autonomy, but rather on the ways the state should be limited and
on how to keep it so limited. This is a more objective and defined focus.
The first inquiry made when an issue of governmental restriction of a
right contained in the Bill of Rights arises involves whether that restric-
tion is necessary. The next question is whether, if the restriction is neces-
sary, the right is needed to keep an effective limit or control on
government. If governmental restriction of the right will eliminate an ef-
fective source of individual or social control over government, then that
government restriction is unconstitutional. The burden here is on the gov-
ernment to prove that right is not necessary to keep government limited.
In the area of speech, for instance, obscenity and defamation have
never been given constitutional protections. This is because obscene and
defamatory speech is not necessary to limit the power of government.
The freedom of individuals to engage in obscene or defamatory expres-
sions is not necessary or valuable to controlling or limiting the power of
government. 145 Furthermore, the courts have often allowed restrictions
on free speech when those restrictions are necessary to protect the rights
of others and yet not necessary to limit government, since the restrictions
do not represent governmental suppression of unpopular ideas. In Sherry
v. Perkins, for instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld
an injunction of labor picketers on the grounds that such picketing vio-
lated the property rights of others. 146 Later, in Vegelahn v. Guntner, the
same court upheld an injunction preventing individuals from patrolling
the streets outside the plaintiff's business in an effort to obtain better
wages, noting that such picketing would injure the plaintiff's property. 1 47
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., the Supreme Court upheld an
injunction against the president of the American Federation of Labor,
preventing him from organizing a boycott of the plaintiff's business, again
reasoning that such a boycott could cause irreparable damage to that bus-
iness. 148 Thus, it is possible to argue that the Supreme Court draws the
boundary of free speech at the point when it interferes with the property
rights of another. It is important, incidentally, to note that the speech in
these cases was directed not against the government, but against private
145. See THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
RESTS UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 422
(1868) (arguing that obscenity and defamation are not related to public issues on which
citizens need to form opinions).
146. 17 N.E. 307, 310 (Mass. 1888).
147. 44 N.E. 1077, 1078 (Mass. 1896).




The limited government model can also explain the Court's decision in
Associated Press v. United States.150 In Associated Press, the Court upheld
the application of antitrust laws to the press, stating that such laws actu-
ally furthered the values underlying the First Amendment. 151 The free-
dom of the press from antitrust laws-or, conversely, the freedom of the
press to become a monopoly-is not a freedom that will help limit gov-
ernment. 152 A similar justification supported the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.53 In that
case, the Court, in upholding restrictions on the number of communica-
tions outlets a single entity could own, stated that such laws were neces-
sary to achieve the "widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources," which was an important First Amend-
ment goal. 154 Here again, a First Amendment freedom to narrow the
range of information sources is not a freedom necessary to limit and con-
trol government.
The Second and Third Amendments 155 likewise serve to limit the
power of the central government. In John Locke's Second Treatise of
Government, the people's right to control or eliminate an abusive govern-
ment required a popular appeal to arms.' 56 Therefore, the Second
Amendment was aimed at the fear that Congress could use its power to
disarm the state militia.1 57 Under the Second Amendment, any such con-
gressional action was prohibited. The framers were very suspicious about
a standing army kept by the central government, and to alleviate this sus-
picion they strove to maintain their state militias.158 Likewise, the Third
Amendment aims to limit the power of an overbearing federal army. Es-
sentially, the Third Amendment "forbids Congress to conscript civilians
as involuntary innkeepers and roommates of soldiers in peacetime. 1 59
As Professor Amar argues, the Third Amendment "stands as an impor-
tant reaffirmation of separation of powers, and limited executive
149. See also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 171-72
(1997) (outlining the courts' frequent use of property rights as a grounds for defeating free
speech defenses).
150. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
151. Id. at 20 (stating that "the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public").
152. Id.
153. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
154. Id. at 785, 802 (quoting Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20).
155. The Third Amendment states: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
156. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 221-43 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952) (1690).
157. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 48, 52, 169, 386
(Jonathan Elliot ed., Ayer Co. reprint ed., 1987) (1836).
158. AMAR, supra note 46, at 53-54.




The jury provisions in the Fourth161 and Seventh 162 Amendments like-
wise serve to empower the people against an overreaching and abusive
central government. As Professor Amar argues, the dominant strategy of
the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments was to keep agents "of the
central government under control" by using "the populist and local insti-
tution of the jury. '163 Thus, just as a state militia could provide a check on
a standing army of the central government, a jury, which had the power
to investigate suspected wrongdoing of central government officials,
could similarly check abuses by powerful prosecutors and judges. As Toc-
queville observed, the jury "places the real direction of society in the
hands of the governed.., and not in that of the government."' 64 Thus the
"jury trial was not simply and always an individual right but also an insti-
tution of localism and popular sovereignty.' 65
Interpreting the Bill of Rights as provisions by which to limit govern-
mental power allows for a more dynamic and flexible process of balanc-
ing individual rights against the needs of society.166 As a set of provisions
seeking to limit governmental power, the Bill of Rights does not elevate
individual rights to an untouchable place, as a trump card against all
other social interests. It serves not only to protect individual interests, but
also to keep government in its prescribed position. Individual rights thus
can be regulated, so long as the governmental power behind that regula-
tion remains limited and does not in any way affect a democratic society's
ability to monitor, criticize, and direct its government. Zechariah
Chafee's theory of free speech, which rests upon the social interest in the
democratic value of free discussion of public matters, similarly views free
160. Id. at 62 (arguing that, as illustrated by the Third Amendment, the federalism and
"separation-of-powers implications of the Bill of Rights often go unnoticed because of our
modern-day fixation on individual rights").
161. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
162. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend.VII.
163. AMAR, supra note 46, at 83 (arguing that "[j]uries, guaranteed in no fewer than
three amendments, were at the heart of the Bill of Rights").
164. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
165. AMAR, supra note 46, at 106.
166. See Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REv. 413,
413-14 (1910) (noting that "[t]he process of continual readjustment between the needs of
society and the protection of individual rights is nowhere more conspicuous than in the
history of the law of defamation").
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speech in a social context. 167 This context illustrates the connection be-
tween individual rights and the conduct of democratic self-government.
Such a balancing between social and individual interests is also present in
the government-limiting aspect of the Bill of Rights. 168 The beauty of see-
ing the Bill of Rights as provisions aimed at limiting government is that,
in this way, they strike a balance between liberty and governmental au-
thority, whereby each individual surrenders enough control over his or
her rights to "permit government to maintain an organized, stable, peace-
ful pattern of human relations. 169
Current notions of property rights, as well as the way they have been
protected by law, also coincide with the limited government model of the
Bill of Rights. For instance, property owners are free to use their prop-
erty as they see fit, "provid[ing] that [they] [do] not infringe on the rights
of others."' 170 Thus, individuals have no natural right to do with property
whatever they desire. The doctrine of eminent domain similarly implies
that private property rights are subject to broader public rights.171 Al-
though the government is allowed to tax property, exercise eminent do-
main over property, and regulate certain uses of property, individual
property rights nonetheless limit governmental power in various ways.
However, if property rights were seen as inviolable natural rights, then all
regulations or taxes would constitute impermissible restrictions on that
property-such a result, however, would essentially overturn much of the
modern law regarding property. 172
In contrast to Lockean liberalism, which focuses on natural rights, his-
torians such as Professors Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood have articu-
lated a model of civic republicanism as the underlying current of
American constitutionalism. 173 Whereas Lockean liberalism focuses on
individual rights, the civic republican tradition sees property as a social
right, one that was created by society, and hence can be regulated in the
public interest. 174 And indeed, this is what occurred during the colonial
and revolutionary periods, with "governmental regulation of property
[being] pervasive during this time.' 75 Consistent with this civic republi-
167. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
168. Chafee, supra note 110, at 957 (arguing that social and individual interests need to
be balanced against each other in order to define the meaning of the First Amendment).
169. CLINTON RoSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 442 (1953).
170. See Bret Boyce, Property as a Natural Right and as a Conventional Right in Consti-
tutional Law, 29 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201, 218 (2007).
171. Id. at 220.
172. See id. at 232-34 (citing RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95, 281 (1985)). "The U.S. Constitution never adopted
an explicit theory of the nature of the right to [private] property," and the Supreme Court's
rulings on property rights have continually reflected a deep conflict over the nature of
these rights. See Boyce, supra note 168, at 270.
173. Boyce, supra note 170, at 234 (citing BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 235 (citing William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State
Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1070-95 (1994)).
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can view, Thomas Jefferson "rejected the Lockean notion that property
rights [were] rooted in nature," instead arguing that "society creates
property rights and ought continually to control them. 1 7 6
Viewing rights, such as those in property, in terms of limitations on
government power, rather than as individual natural rights, provides bet-
ter and more objective guidance to courts. For instance, "Justice Iredell
rejected judicial review based solely" on the principles of natural law and
natural rights. 177 Since the parameters of natural law and natural rights
are "indeterminate" and uncertain, they "cannot form an adequate basis
of constitutional adjudication. 1 78 According to Justice Iredell, "the ideas
of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard. 1 79 When the fram-
ers sought to protect a right or freedom on its own accord, rather than as
a means of limiting power, they did so in a manner that would protect
that right or freedom from all governments, including state govern-
ments.180 The Contract Clause, for instance, specifically applies to both
the federal and state governments. 8 1
In Ogden v. Saunders, a majority of justices rejected the view that
property rights could be determined by reference to natural law. "Ac-
cording to Justice Washington, '[W]henever they come into collision with
each other,' positive law 'is paramount' and natural law 'is to be taken in
strict subordination to [it].'"182 The Taney Court further developed the
theory that property rights were constitutionally protected "under the
contracts or charters that created them," rather than as "natural rights
existing independent of those contracts or charters."t 8 3 The nature of
property rights in the Constitution as a means by which to limit the power
of government, rather than to protect natural rights, can be seen in the
Court's takings opinions.1 8 4 For instance, "[w]hile property may be regu-
176. See id. at 237. James Madison, however, saw as a threat to private property various
governmental actions, including "agrarian laws, debtor relief, paper money, and other re-
distributive schemes." Id. at 242. Consequently, the Due Process and Taking Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment were means of limiting the power of government over private property.
Id. at 245-48.
177. Id. at 271 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798)).
178. Id. at 271 (discussing Justice Iredell's view of national law).
179. Id. (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 349 (Iredell, J.)).
180. See id. at 272.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 259 (1827)).
Justice Johnson also noted that "our Constitution no where speaks the language of men in
a state of nature," and that in civil society, "the state decides how far the social exercise of
the rights of contract can be justly asserted." Id. (quoting Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at
290, 282 (Johnson, J.)).
183. Id. at 273 (arguing that "the [C]ourt recognized the right of democratic govern-
ments to define those rights prospectively as they saw fit, provided that they did not trench
upon invested interests created by prior enactments"). Id. This approach was done away
with by the Lochner Court, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which "elevated the principle of laissez-
faire capitalism" to the status of natural and fundamental right. Id. at 276. However, this
approach by the Lochner Court, "as evidenced by its expansive view of property rights at
the expense of legislative reform efforts, undermined respect for the institution of constitu-
tional judicial review both within the United States and throughout the world." Id. at 276.
184. See id. at 277-78.
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lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking.' 185 Thus, it is clear that property can be somewhat regulated;
however, when it goes "too far," or when government overreaches be-
yond its limited functions, then the Takings Clause will come into effect.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT APPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITED
GOVERNMENTAL MODEL
A. THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS THAT LIMIT GOVERNMENT
The First Amendment begins with the words "Congress shall make no
law."1 86 This language "may well" express the notion that Congress
lacked any enumerated power to regulate religion, speech, or press.187 In
this respect, the First Amendment does not express or protect a "private
right of citizens based on personal liberty," but rather a state's structural
"right rooted in federalism.' 88 Thus, as with all of the first ten amend-
ments, the First Amendment focuses on the protections of structural
rights related to restrictions upon federal government power-restric-
tions meant to prohibit interference with the rights of the states and of
their citizens.' 8 9 As Professor Akhil Amar notes, it is a remarkable fact
that, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court "never-not once-referred to the 1791 [Bill of Rights] as 'the' or
'a' 'Bill of Rights."' 90
In its free exercise decisions, the Court has seemed to follow a limited
government model of the First Amendment. 19' In Employment Division
v. Smith, the Court upheld an Oregon statute outlawing the use of peyote,
a hallucinogenic cactus, which implicated the right of Native Americans
to use that substance in their religious ceremonies.1 92 The Court adopted
a narrow construction of the Free Exercise Clause and denied the availa-
bility of free exercise exemptions from neutral, generally applicable
laws. 193 Thus, arguably, the Court moved away from any fundamental
185. Id. at 278 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
186. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
187. AMAR, supra note 46, at 233.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434 (1847) (discussing the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments).
190. AMAR, supra note 46, at 284.
191. Of course, the Establishment Clause is a blatantly structural limitation on the fed-
eral government. It prohibited Congress from "interfering with, or trying to disestablish,
churches established by state and local governments." Id. at 32. Moreover, the First
Amendment specifically suggests that Congress has no power to regulate religion. This
very much reflects a federalism-based approach. The possibility of national control over
such a powerful social institution as religion, which shaped the behavior and cultivated the
habits of the citizenry, "struck fear in the hearts of Anti-Federalists." Id. at 45. However,
"local control over such intermediate organizations seemed far less threatening, less dis-
tant, less aristocratic, less monopolistic." Id. National control over religion would have
been horribly oppressive to many of the framing generation, but local control over religion
"would allow dissenters in any place to vote with their feet and find a community with the
right religious tone." Id.
192. 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990).
193. Id. at 881-82.
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rights or natural rights view of the First Amendment, instead using the
Free Exercise Clause as a way to limit the government's power to target
particular religious practices or groups. 194 The Smith decision thus under-
cuts a conception of the Free Exercise Clause as "an affirmative guaran-
tee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without
impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct con-
flicts with a neutral, generally applicable law."'195 In using the limited
government model, Smith bans the government from singling out the
weak or minority religions, whereas majority or dominant religions can
obviously survive on their political strength. Thus, the Court in Smith did
not try to protect religious exercise as some kind of fundamental individ-
ual right. Instead, the crux of the decision focused upon limiting the gov-
ernment's ability to act in certain ways.
The Speech and Press Clauses are structural provisions, focusing, at
least in part, on the "representational linkage between Congress and its
constituents."' 96 They serve to safeguard the power of a "democratic peo-
ple against a possibly unrepresentative and self-interested Congress."' 197
Obviously, free speech plays an important role in a democratic society-
it allows local majorities to form opinions and alliances that can control
and limit the actions of the federal government. 198 Thus, as Professor
Amar notes, the First Amendment is not only about protecting minority
rights from majoritarian rule, but is also about trying to achieve local con-
trol of a more distant central government. 199 This role of limiting govern-
ment can be seen throughout First Amendment jurisprudence.
In Reno v. ACL U, the Court granted full First Amendment protection
to the Internet. Striking down the Communications Decency Act on the
grounds that it would "confer broad powers of censorship," the Court
limited the government from controlling the Internet and kept that me-
dium as a free and open venue of communication, providing a check on
government. 200 Previously, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court
held that defamatory speech about public officials enjoys First Amend-
194. Id. at 877-78.
195. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. AMAR, supra note 46, at 20.
197. Id. at 21.
198. Id. at 26. According to Professor Amar, the "right of the people to assemble does
not simply protect the ability of self-selected clusters of individuals to meet together; it is
also an express reservation of the collective right ... to assemble in a future convention
and exercise our sovereign right to alter or abolish our government." Id. This right is the
right of the people to "bring wayward government to heel by assembling in convention."
Id.
199. See id. at 31. One way to achieve citizen control over the central government is to
have free social institutions that provide for citizen education. As Professor Amar argues:
The idea of popular education resurfaces over and over in the Bill of Rights.
As we have seen, each of the three intermediate associations it safeguards-
church, militia, and jury-was understood as a device for educating ordinary
citizens about their rights and duties. An educated populous cannot be a
truly sovereign populous.
Id. at 133.
200. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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ment protection unless that speech is made with a knowledge of falsity or
a reckless disregard for the truth.2 0 1 By protecting speech directed at pub-
lic officials, Sullivan allows a democratic society to engage in the kind of
political speech necessary to control and limit its government. In Burson
v. Freeman, the Court upheld a content-based restriction against cam-
paign speech within 100 feet of a polling place.20 2 Even though the law
singled out speech with a particular content, the subject speech was ar-
guably not necessary to limit government. In fact, the law actually as-
sisted the political process, and in this way helped a democratic society
shape and control its government.20 3 Likewise, the Court, in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, upheld a law regulating corporate ex-
penditures in political campaigns. 20 4 According to the Court, such corpo-
rate activity could have a corrosive and distorting effect on political
campaigns, and thus detract from a democratic society's ability to control
and limit its government.20 5 On the other hand, general corporate speech
on matters of public interest "can serve as an effective check on govern-
mental excess. '20 6
The argument that commercial speech should not be given full consti-
tutional protection, because it causes more harm than other kinds of fully
protected political speech is made irrelevant by the limited government
model. Under this model, the question is not what kind of speech is "bet-
ter" or "less harmful." Instead, the question is what kind of speech should
be insulated from government control because that speech is necessary to
ensure maintenance of a limited government.
In giving commercial speech less constitutional protection than politi-
cal speech, the Court has recognized that commercial speech is less vital
to the democratic society's ability to control and limit its government,
because such speech is primarily about consumer transactions occurring
within the economic sphere of society.20 7 In contrast to political speech,
commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position . . . in the scale of
First Amendment values. ' 20 8 Consequently, commercial speech is not
given full constitutional protection.20 9
201. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
202. 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
203. Id. (stating that the law at issue dealt with voter intimidation and fraud).
204. 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990).
205. Id. at 666.
206. Martin Redish & Howard Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 235, 248, 262 (1998) (arguing that "corporations are uniquely suited to
provide the electorate with information that will make it more informed as to many of the
socio-economic issues facing the nation").
207. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 779, 770 (1976) (stating that "some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely
permissible"). To judge whether regulatory restrictions on commercial speech are permissi-
ble, the Court has created a four-part test that is less stringent than the strict scrutiny test
used to evaluate restrictions on political speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
208. Unites States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993).
209. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Courts have "upheld
the ability of government to categorically exclude ordinary business corporations from par-
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In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,21 0 the Court held that a defense at-
torney could be punished for conducting a press conference, during which
the lawyer opined about the innocence of a client and the presence of
police corruption in a pending case. Although such speech would be pro-
tected if made by a private individual or a member of the press, this deci-
sion can be explained in terms of the limited government model.
Restrictions on lawyers' speech during the pendency of a court action do
not infringe on a democratic society's ability to control and limit govern-
ment. Indeed, a criminal case is supposed to be free from democratic gov-
ernmental control. Moreover, any speech by the lawyer involving
innocence of a client or the occurrence of police corruption can be made
within the courtroom, where such speech is the most relevant and has the
most impact.
In Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC,211 the Court upheld the
must-carry regulations, which required cable operators to carry the sig-
nals of broadcast television stations. Although this law seemingly re-
stricted the editorial autonomy of cable systems operators, it did not
infringe on the ability of a democratic public to limit and control its gov-
ernment. In fact, the law arguably promoted the diversity of voices and
information available to the public, which in turn helps limit government.
The Court's refusal to give journalists special immunity from grand jury
subpoenas requiring the identification of confidential sources has been
interpreted in some quarters as an anti-First Amendment ruling. In
Branzburg v. Hayes,212 the Court refused to grant to the press a special
right, unavailable to the general public, to refuse to reveal confidential
sources. Such rights would have boosted the power of the press; however,
there is no proof or necessary connection that such special privileges
under the First Amendment are needed to limit the power of govern-
ment. The privilege would not necessarily limit government; it would only
enhance the power of the press.
The Court has also upheld disclosure requirements for contributors to
political campaigns. 213 However, the Court has required that an excep-
tion be made to this rule when enforcement would deter contributions to
unpopular political groups, thereby jeopardizing speech rights. 214 Thus,
there is no fundamental right of anonymity in political campaigns contri-
butions. Again, a right of anonymity does not necessarily help limited
government; instead, disclosure requirements produce transparency that
can be good for the democratic process.
ticipation in core political speech, an exclusion that would be unthinkable with respect to
an individual citizen wishing to participate in a public debate." James Weinstein, Speech
Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism Lessons from Nike v. Kaske,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1115-16 (2004).
210. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
211. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
212. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
213. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
214. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 95, 98 (1982).
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Another example of the limited government aspect of the First
Amendment can be seen in federal securities laws, which compel certain
disclosures, such as a corporation's financial condition, and restrict
speech such as unapproved proxy solicitations. Although the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the First Amendment's application to
such securities regulations, it is generally believed that the Free Speech
Clause should not apply to the speech affected by such regulations. 21 5
Thus, speech subject to securities regulations can be restricted because
such speech-for example, fraudulent or misleading speech about a cor-
poration's financial condition-is not necessary to limit the power of gov-
ernment. Regulation of securities-related speech provides for the
effective functioning of the capital markets; it does not diminish a demo-
cratic society's ability to control and direct its government. Consequently,
the First Amendment should not apply to securities regulation because
such regulations do not unduly expand the power of government such
that a democratic public will be less able to control and direct that
government.
B. POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE LIMITED GOVERNMENT MODEL
In the free speech area, the limited government model is further sup-
ported by the argument that political speech should be given the highest
First Amendment protections. This is because free political speech is
needed to maintain democratic control of government. As long as a dem-
ocratic society has the freedom to engage in open and uninhibited politi-
cal speech, that society is able to direct, control, and alter the course of its
government. But if any laws infringe on political speech, those laws essen-
tially enlarge the power of government by making it less amenable to
change and alteration by a democratic society. As Justice Douglas ex-
plained in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, "it is only through free debate
and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the
will of the people. '216
Under the political speech doctrine, the First Amendment gives its pri-
mary and highest protection to that speech which is vital in sustaining
self-government. According to this theory, the role of free speech in the
process of self-government provides the only compelling justification for
the constitutional protection of speech; thus, under this theory, individual
self-actualization or autonomy cannot provide a sufficiently strong basis
for such constitutional protection.217 Alexander Meiklejohn was an early
215. See Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to Securities
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 789-90 (2007).
216. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
217. For a detailed description of the political speech doctrine and the argument that
the First Amendment served primarily to protect political speech, see PATRICK M. GARRY,
REDISCOVERING A LOST FREEDOM: THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CENSOR UN-
WANTED SPEECH 113-127 (2006); Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Politi-
cal Speech: Exploring a Constitutional Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative
Channels of Communications, 72 Mo. L. REV. 477, 514-20 (2007).
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advocate of the self-governance value of free speech.218 He limited the
First Amendment's free speech protections to political speech, viewing
those constitutional protections as existing primarily to serve democratic
processes. 219
Subsequently, a number of contemporary legal scholars have adopted
at least a form of Meiklejohn's political speech theory. According to Pro-
fessor BeVier, "The sole legitimate [F]irst [Ajmendment principle pro-
tects only speech that participates in the process of representative
democracy. ' 220 Professor Sunstein proposes a "two-tier First Amend-
ment," whereby restrictions on political speech are subjected to the strict-
est scrutiny, whereas restrictions on nonpolitical speech are given a much
lower level of scrutiny. 22 1 Moreover, on numerous occasions, the Su-
preme Court has stated similar opinions regarding the role of political
speech within the First Amendment context. In Burson v. Freeman, the
Court stated that the First Amendment serves primarily "to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. ' 222 According to the Court in
FCC v. League of Women Voters, speech concerning "public issues" occu-
pies the "highest rung" of constitutional concerns and is thus deserving of
the widest protection by the First Amendment. 223 The Court in Buckley
v. Valeo stated that "the First Amendment affords the broadest protec-
tion to such political expression. ' 224 And in Mills v. Alabama, the Court
wrote that "a major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. '225 Of course, there is no ques-
tion that political speech is difficult to define.226 Nonetheless, the task is
not an impossible one, and a number of legal scholars have made efforts
to do so. For instance, Professor Sunstein defines political speech as
speech "both intended and received as a contribution to public delibera-
tion about some issue."' 227 Professor Sunstein argues that words or ex-
pressions made "in a way that is not plausibly part of social deliberation
about an issue" should not qualify for constitutional protection. 228
218. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CON-
STITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965).
219. For an analysis of Professor Meiklejohn's views, see PATRICK M. GARRY, THE
AMERICAN VISION OF A FREE PRESS: AN HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONIST
VIEW OF THE PRESS AS A MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 74-80 (1990).
220. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 358 (1978).
221. See Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301-12 (1992).
222. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992).
223. 468 U.S. 364, 383, 381 (1984) (citations omitted).
224. 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
225. 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Pub.
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) ("There can be no doubt that the expenditures at
issue in this case [expenditures by independent political committees] produce speech at the
core of the First Amendment.").
226. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in such a determination, as well as a
discussion on how such political speech is to be defined, see PATRICK M. GARRY, REDIS-
COVERING A LOST FREEDOM 115-16 (2006).
227. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 130 (1993).
228. See Sunstein, supra note 221, at 312.
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The First Amendment's focus on political speech fits perfectly with the
limited government model of the Bill of Rights. Political speech receives
the highest protection under the First Amendment because such speech
directly relates to the conduct of democratic self-government, and it is by
the process of self-government that democratic society can control and
limit the power of its government. On the other hand, speech on matters
of merely private concern is not the kind of speech needed to limit gov-
ernment; therefore, its restriction can be tolerated more by the First
Amendment.
Laws impacting or restricting political speech can hobble the ability of
the individual or the public to control or limit government. For instance, a
law banning all flag burning, assuming that the burning of a flag is most
likely a means of communicating a political idea, can effectively eliminate
a way for the public to protest the activities of the government. 229 Simi-
larly, a law imposing a special tax on newspaper ink may very well restrict
the flow of political speech by penalizing newspapers that criticize the
government. 230 However, when political speech is not involved, then the
issue of limited government and the public's ability to limit government
may not be present.
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court overturned
regulations requiring sexually-oriented cable providers, like the Playboy
Channel, to limit their programming transmission to the late-night hours
of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. 231 Prior to this law, sexually-explicit cable oper-
ators had used signal scrambling as a means of limiting programming ac-
cess to their subscribing customers. But this scrambling had proven
ineffective, often leading to "signal bleed," which allowed non-paying
viewers, including children, to hear and see the sexually-explicit program-
ming.2 32 Although recognizing the states' interest in shielding children
from such programming, the Court nonetheless struck down the law on
the grounds that it was too burdensome on adult viewers.233 In dissent,
Justice Breyer argued that the law applied only to programming involving
"'virtually 100% sexually explicit' material. '234 And finally, he argued
that the law placed only a burden on sexually-explicit cable programming,
not a ban.235 Justice Breyer also argued that due to signal bleed, almost
thirty million children each year were exposed to sexually-explicit cable
programming. 236 Thus, according to Justice Breyer, the programming in-
229. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that a conviction for burning
the American flag violates the First Amendment).
230. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
579 (1983).
231. 529 U.S. 803, 806-07 (2000).
232. Id. at 806.
233. Id. at 807.
234. Id. at 839.
235. Id. at 845.
236. Id. at 842. A similar decision was reached in Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Con-
sortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). Denver Area involved a challenge to regulations
requiring cable operators to segregate indecent programs on separate blocked channels,
which could be unblocked after a subscriber made a written request for unblocking. Id. at
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volved in Playboy was not the kind of speech on which the First Amend-
ment should confer its highest protections.
In Playboy Entertainment Group, the requirement that cable purveyors
of sexually explicit material had to confine their programming to night-
time hours, when young children would least likely be watching televi-
sion, had no real impact on the public's structural ability to limit
government. Unlike the flag burning case and the newsprint tax case,
which affected the ways in which individuals could engage in political
speech, Playboy Entertainment only dealt with issues surrounding when
certain commercial cable vendors of sexually explicit material could
transmit their programming.
V. CONCLUSION
The framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights very much believed in the
theory of natural rights. This theory had greatly inspired the Declaration
of Independence and America's break with England. However, despite
this strong belief, the ratifiers did not intend that the Bill of Rights would
serve exclusively, or even primarily, as a protection or expression of indi-
vidual natural rights. Although much of the scholarly literature focuses
on the Bill of Rights as concerned exclusively or primarily with individual
rights or autonomy, this focus deviates from the framers' intent underly-
ing the Bill of Rights. What is often ignored about the Bill of Rights is
that it was drafted and ratified with a view toward integrating it into the
overall scheme of the original Constitution. This scheme or focus, accord-
ing to near unanimous historical opinion, was one of structure. The origi-
nal Constitution set out to create certain types of governmental
structures; it did not seek to incorporate or dictate substantive values and
norms. The most important structural aspect of the original Constitution
was one of limited government. The whole scheme of the Constitution
focused on setting up structures to ensure that the new central govern-
ment was a limited one.
The Bill of Rights simply sought to reinforce the limited government
focus of the original Constitution. It continued the goal of ensuring lim-
ited government, but it did so by specifying particular areas in which the
government was prohibited from extending its power. Thus, the Bill of
Rights, and the entire Constitution, focuses not on individual values or
norms, but on governmental structure. The focus of the Bill of Rights is
on limiting government, not on providing for individual autonomy or
fulfillment.
One justification for the limited government model of the Bill of Rights
is that it would have been impossible to list all of the natural rights the
framers wished to protect. Furthermore, the framers would not have
732-35. But the Court overturned these regulations, even though any interested viewer
could obtain access to the programming merely by submitting a written request, and even
though the Court recognized that the regulations were meant to protect children and only
applied to sexual material. Id.
2009] 1781
SMU LAW REVIEW
wanted to give the judiciary the kind of wide-ranging power needed to
define the scope of each natural right to be protected. It was much more
manageable for the courts to focus on limiting government than to focus
on ensuring individual autonomy in a democratic society. With a limited
government focus, the courts could approach Bill of Rights issues more
objectively and consistently. As will be discussed in future articles, it was
later left to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to provide for the adequate protection of individual rights. In a subse-
quent article, it will also be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
maintained the limited government aspect of the Bill of Rights, but sim-
ply applied this model to state governments in addition to the federal
government.
During the New Deal constitutional revolution, the Court, in order to
accommodate New Deal legislation, retreated from enforcing the Consti-
tution's structural provisions. Instead, the Court suggested that it would
concentrate its attentions on individual rights matters, scrutinizing them
much more closely than structural matters. However, this turned out to
be a contradictory approach. Since the Bill of Rights was essentially
structural, the Court was simply choosing one set of structural provisions
to enforce while ignoring other structural provisions, such as those involv-
ing federalism and separation of powers. Moreover, the Court made a
fundamental mistake when it chose to wage its individual rights revolu-
tion through the Bill of Rights. The mistake was interpreting the Bill of
Rights as exclusively concerned with individual rights and autonomy,
rather than with providing structural limitations on government.
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